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Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian
Criminal Law:
The Marijuana Trilogy and the
Forcible “Correction” of Children
Janine Benedet*

I. INTRODUCTION
When taken together, it is possible to reduce an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Malmo-Levine,1 upholding the
prohibition on possession of marijuana, and its decision in Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),2 upholding the defence of “reasonable correction” for parents and
teachers charged with assaulting a child, as signaling a posture of deference to Parliament in matters of criminal law. It is also possible to explain the decisions as indicating that while abuse of oneself can be
considered criminal, at least some abuse of one’s children may not.
Viewed more charitably, and probably with more accuracy, the two
decisions can be seen as saying something very important about the
limits of the criminal law and the role that section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms plays in setting those limits.3 To that

*

LL.B. (U.B.C.), LL.M., S.J.D. (Mich.); Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law
School, Toronto, Ontario.
1
R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 179
C.C.C. (3d) 517 released concurrently with R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, [2003] S.C.J. No.
80, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 540 [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine” or “the marijuana possession case”].
2
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6 [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation” or “the
section 43 challenge”].
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “Charter”].
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end, it is significant that the majority on the section 7 analysis is composed of substantially the same members of the Court in both cases.4
In addition, the decision in Canadian Foundation, while reinforcing
the ongoing debate at the Supreme Court on the proper understanding of
section 15(1) of the Charter, deals a blow to historically subordinated
groups seeking to use the right to equality to expose their experiences of
state-sanctioned and socially accepted violence. In particular, the apparent revival by the Court of the long-discredited public/private distinction
as relevant to the legal understanding of crimes of violence deserves
scrutiny.
The attempt by some members of the Court to establish a “de minimis” principle in criminal law also links these two decisions. As a matter of the division of powers, the federal criminal law power in section
91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 5 is very broad and not constrained
by a meaningful “harm” requirement. The decisions in Canadian Foundation and Malmo-Levine make clear that the substantive content of the
“principles of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter do not
permit the courts to evaluate rigorously under the ambit of the “harm”
principle Parliament’s decisions to invoke the criminal law power beyond a de minimis threshold. Yet even the invocation of a de minimis
standard may represent a substantial shift in thinking in light of the
historic reluctance of criminal courts to recognize de minimis as a common law defence. Thus it is worth considering whether the real impact
of these decisions, and in particular of Malmo-Levine, will be to revive
such a defence.
Taken together, these decisions are especially troubling to this author because I think that the Court got it right in Malmo-Levine, and
wrong in Canadian Foundation. Yet not a single member of the Court

4

In Malmo-Levine, majority reasons were written together by Gonthier and Binnie JJ.,
concurred in by McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major and Bastarache JJ. Arbour, Deschamps
and LeBel JJ. dissented. In Canadian Foundation, McLachlin C.J. wrote the majority reasons,
with Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. concurring. Justice Binnie dissented in part on the s. 15 ground, but agreed with the majority on its interpretation and
application of s. 7. In both cases, Arbour and Deschamps JJ. dissented. Thus the only judge to
take a different view of the application of s. 7 in the two cases was LeBel J.
5
Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
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shared these views in their entirety.6 This paper, therefore, argues for a
result not supported by any member of the Court: uphold the prohibition
on marijuana possession and strike down the “reasonable correction”
defence.

II. SECTION 7 AND THE “HARM” PRINCIPLE
The section 7 analysis in Malmo-Levine is premised on the defendant’s assertion that the principles of fundamental justice include a
“harm principle”. This principle would prevent recourse to the criminal
law where the conduct in question was not harmful at all, or alternatively where it could not be shown to pose a significant risk of harm to
others. The Court struggles with this proposition, in part because it must
deal with three different harm principles: “harm” as a component of the
criminal law power in section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867;
“harm” as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the
Charter; and “harm” as trigger for a common law defence of de minimis
non curat lex. The question is whether the “harm principle” under section 7 is something different than these two other understandings of
harm in the criminal law, or whether they should be interpreted as three
coterminous manifestations of the same principle. While the court does
not quite characterize the issue before it in this way, the interrelationship
between these three types of harm is important to understanding the
majority’s conclusion in Malmo-Levine.
The first context in which the concept of “harm” is relevant is in the
application of the federal criminal law power in section 91(27) of the
Constitution Act, 1867. In the companion appeal of R. v. Caine,7 the
appellant argued that the criminalization of marijuana possession fell
outside the federal jurisdiction over criminal law. The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this argument. The Court accepted that one major
purpose of the prohibition on marijuana possession had always been to
protect health and public safety. This brought it within the permissible
scope of the criminal law, which required “some evil or injurious or

6

Justice Binnie comes closest in the result. Justice Binnie upheld the prohibition on
marijuana possession, but would have found that the s. 43 defence violated the equality rights
of children as it applied to teachers.
7
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79.
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undesirable effect upon the public against whom the law is directed”.8
According to the Court, so long as some legitimate public purpose underlies the prohibition, and it does not colourably invade an area of
provincial competence, the law is intra vires Parliament. Control of a
psychoactive drug that causes alteration of mental function raised clear
issues of public health and safety, bringing it within the ambit of section
91(27). The Court specifically noted that the protection of vulnerable
groups from self-inflicted harm, characterized by the appellant as impermissible “legal moralism”, was a legitimate concern of the criminal
law.
The division of powers argument did not, in any event, really address the substance of the defendants’ complaint about marijuana prohibition, which was directed at the fact of prohibition itself, rather than at
the idea that it should fall within provincial competence. Using the division of powers to strike down laws that trench on civil liberties may
have been a necessity in the pre-Charter era, but it makes little sense
now in this context, unless the argument is able to distinguish what is
distinct about the criminal prohibition that limits its use in cases where a
provincial offence would be acceptable.9
The difference cannot be the use of imprisonment, since provincial
offences can carry terms of imprisonment as well, and section 7 turns in
any event on the significance of the deprivation of liberty. Nor is it the
mere fact of the availability of prosecution by indictment, which tends
to give the accused more procedural rights (like a jury trial). The relevant point might be the imposition of a criminal record, particularly
since the effect such a record has on the ability to find work or travel
abroad can be significant. Most human rights statutes that protect
against discrimination on the basis of one’s “record of offences” limit
that protection to provincial records, indicating that the criminal record
is seen as legitimately carrying significant stigma, at least where no
pardon has been granted.10 While the negative effects of a criminal record were clearly raised in argument before the Court, their connection
to the division of powers argument appears to have been unexplored.
8

Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 73, quoting the “Margarine Reference” (Reference re Validity of section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, at 49).
9
For a summary of this history see, P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2003 1st. ed.), at pp. 684-85.
10
See, e.g., Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 10(1) (“record of offences”).
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The question that arises with respect to section 7 of the Charter is
whether the principles of fundamental justice include a notion of harm
that is more definite than the elastic boundaries of the federal criminal
law power. The answer to this question must focus on the fact that the
section 7 liberty interest is engaged in situations in which the law is not
merely penal in character, but also carries with it the potential for imprisonment. Should the availability of imprisonment change the degree
of harm required from the “legitimate public purpose” of the division of
powers analysis to a requirement of significant or substantial harm? Or,
in the alternative, should it require proof that the risk of harm is to persons other than the accused?
The notion that the principles of fundamental justice demand an examination of the relationship between the state interest and the use of
the penalty of imprisonment to further that interest is not without jurisprudential support. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the majority held that a breach of section 7 is made out where “the
deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance the
state’s interest” since “the individual’s rights will have been deprived
for no valid purpose”.11 Yet even these comments, focusing on whether
the use of criminal law advances the state interest, assume that such an
interest does exist. In Malmo-Levine, the defendants primarily argued
that there was no valid state interest at all. In the alternative, they asserted that criminalization does more harm than good in achieving any
such interest.
The majority of the Court in Malmo-Levine, relying on its decision
in Rodriguez, finds that a principle of fundamental justice must be:
a legal principle about which there is significant societal consensus that it
is fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to
operate, and it must be identified with sufficient precision to yield a
manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of
12
...liberty....

The majority rejects the argument that a harm principle, defined in
these terms, is a principle of fundamental justice. The majority doubts
that the “harm principle” is properly characterized as legal principle, but
11
12

[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 594, [1993] S.C.J. No. 94.
Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 113.
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even assuming such a characterization, they find that it is not a requirement for criminal prohibition. There are Code offences that do not cause
harm to living persons (like cruelty to animals or interference with a
dead body) and those which cause no harm to anyone other than the
individuals who consent to them (like dueling or “consensual” incest).13
Canadian criminal law has rejected the idea that punishing harm to self
is impermissible paternalism, noted the majority, since the costs of selfharm are often borne collectively. What is more, Canadian society is
willing to recognize the validity of punishing “moral harm” in the sense
of conduct that threatens fundamental or essential social values. This led
the majority to conclude that, “Parliament ... is entitled to act under the
criminal law power in the protection of legitimate state interests other
than the avoidance of harm to others, subject to Charter limits such as
the rules against arbitrariness, irrationality and gross disproportionality”.14
What sort of limits, if any, are placed by this last condition? “Arbitrariness and irrationality” sound a lot like the kinds of very elastic
thresholds constraining the use of the criminal law power in section
91(27). As for “gross disproportionality”, it refers, of course, to the test
for “cruel and unusual punishment” under section 12, imported into
section 7. On this point, the majority finds that it is the use of imprisonment that is relevant, rather than the availability of imprisonment. Since
imprisonment is rarely imposed for simple possession absent aggravating factors, neither section 7 nor section 12 is violated. This approach in
general makes sense, as many criminal offences provide a range of
sentences whose upper end would be grossly disproportionate if imposed for conduct at the lower end. Manslaughter, where the available
sentences range from probation to life imprisonment, is a good example.15 The remedy for such excesses, explains the Court, is an ordinary
sentence appeal. Thus one can distinguish the prohibition on marijuana

13

Of course, there are reasonable claims of “harm” that can attach to all of these actions. Cruelty to animals does cause unnecessary pain to a living creature. Interference with a
dead body presents public health concerns, in addition to causing distress to the bereaved.
“Consensual” incest is often anything but mutually beneficial and desired. Citing these
examples, then, is not meant to endorse the Court’s invocation of them; one does not have to
embrace the value of legal paternalism to find a reason for upholding bestiality laws.
14
Supra, note 1, at para. 129.
15
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 236(b).
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possession from the prohibition on importing narcotics struck down in
R. v. Smith, where the seven-year sentence of imprisonment was mandatory regardless of the quantity imported, and from the Motor Vehicle
Reference, where the Court did say that the potential for imprisonment
was enough to violate section 7 where there was no mens rea required
for conviction.16
Yet the “gross disproportionality” standard may still operate in an
offence with a wide range of possible sentences in a fashion akin to the
principle of de minimis non curat lex. The de minimis principle, typically translated as the maxim that “the law does not concern itself with
trifling things”, has not found general acceptance in Canadian criminal
law despite its longevity.17 If recognized in the criminal law, the de
minimis principle would operate as a common law defence in the nature
of an excuse that would allow the accused the opportunity to establish
that, even though the actus reus and mens rea of the offence are made
out, the breach is so trivial that no criminal culpability should be attached.18 This principle might apply to the man charged with theft for
sampling a cashew from the “bulk bin” at the supermarket, or the student charged with assault for spraying a classmate with a water pistol.
Such “cases” are typically dealt with through the exercise of social
convention. We rely heavily on social understandings about what sort of
behaviour is too trivial to merit state involvement to dissuade individuals from complaining to the police about such matters. When that consensus is disrupted, we rely on police and prosecutorial discretion to
screen out trivial cases from prosecution. Yet this is not a uniform or
reliable result. Most criminal defence lawyers have represented clients
charged with theft for stealing items of nominal value, pursuant to a
16

R. v. Smith (Edward Dewey), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 36; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 23
C.C.C. (3d) 289, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73.
17
R. v. Chau, [1996] A.J. No. 1019 (Prov. Ct.) (sargeant touched junior officer on scarf
and buttocks, de minimis applied to acquit of sexual assault); R. v. Chessa, [1983] B.C.J. No.
1201 (C.A.) (intoxicated accused called taxi from bar, moved his car to another parking space
before taking taxi home; court undecided if de minimis exists but driving not trivial, accused
convicted of impaired driving); R. v. Joe, [1992] Y.J. No. 140 (Terr. Ct.) (de minimis applied
to acquit accused of assault for shaking co-worker); R. v. Appleby, (1990) 78 C.R. (3d) 282,
[1990] O.J. No. 1329 (Prov. Ct.) (de minimis applied to acquit accused of possession of stolen
property where copy of budget document valued at $0.02).
18
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 8(3).
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retailer’s “zero tolerance” anti-shoplifting policies.19 Moreover, courts
have shown considerable reluctance to apply the de minimis principle to
Criminal Code offences, notwithstanding a willingness to recognize it in
other settings.20
Yet the majority in Malmo-Levine appears to accept the relevance of
the de minimis principle for section 7, noting that “[o]nce it is demonstrated, as it has been here, that the harm is not de minimis, or in the
words of Braidwood J.A., the harm is ‘not [in]significant or trivial,’ the
precise weighing and calculation of the nature and extent of the harm is
Parliament’s job”.21 This seems to indicate an acceptance by the Supreme Court of the de minimis defence, at least where there is a liberty
interest at stake. Malmo-Levine may therefore represent an implicit
recognition that the de minimis principle is a principle of fundamental
justice and thus a valid common law defence.
Justice Arbour, in her dissenting reasons in Canadian Foundation,
would also be prepared to recognize the de minimis principle in the
criminal law setting. She argues that the defence could be raised for
trivial assaults which, in the parent-child context, might include a “pat
on the bum” or the placing of an unwilling child in a car seat. In fact,
some trial judges in assault cases have considered the defence; most
have declined to conclusively decide its availability, and have proceeded
to find the assault not a trivial one in any event.22 Justice Arbour notes
that the principle could also apply where defendants are in possession of
very small amounts of marijuana. At least one lower court has reached
such a result, in a situation where the accused was in possession of a
pipe that tested positive for marijuana residue.23

19

See, e.g., R. v. Li, [1984] O.J. No. 569 (H.C.), where the judge allowed the Crown’s
appeal from an acquittal for theft where the value of the stolen screwdriver bit was less than
$1.00. The High Court judge found that the trial judge erred in recognizing a de minimis
principle in theft cases.
20
See, e.g., Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] S.C.J. No. 62, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1031, at para. 65 (breach of contract).
21
Malmo-Levine, supra, note 1, at para. 133.
22
See, e.g., R. v. Daniels, [2001] S.J. No. 503 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Phillips, [1992] N.B.J.
No. 135 (Prov. Ct.).
23
A useful summary of the inconsistent availability of the defence in the context of
drug possession is found in R. v. Brett (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 353, [1985] B.C.J. No. 3049
(Co. Ct.); revd (1986), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 190, [1986] B.C.J. No. 751.
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There is a clear reluctance on the part of trial courts to recognize the
de minimis defence. This reluctance stems in part from their obligation
to follow the language of the statute. If Parliament wanted to specify a
minimum amount of drugs that one might legally possess before the
criminal sanction is triggered, it is free to do so. In addition, there is a
very real concern about where the triviality ends. Certainly defendants
in cases of spousal violence against women have, predictably, attempted
to invoke the defence.24
It is also important to note that those cases which have considered
the application of de minimis to charges of marijuana possession have
focused on the trivial harm based on the amount of drugs possessed. The
courts have not considered whether the de minimis defence should apply
on the basis that the harm of possessing marijuana for personal consumption is itself trivial. The connection between the two claims is
obvious: how else to explain why the law should not concern itself with
possession of marijuana residue in a pipe except by reference to the lack
of harm that residue might cause? Of course, implicit in the recognition
of the defence is the understanding that there must be some violations of
the law that are not trivial. The majority of the Supreme Court found
some specific examples of the harm of marijuana consumption, for
example, to vulnerable groups such as adolescents. It remains to be seen
whether a de minimis defence might succeed where it can be shown that
a particular defendant does not fall into one of the groups the Court sees
the law as validly protecting.25
The real issue in these cases is one of institutional competence.
Given that almost any conduct carries with it some non-trivial risk of
harm, who is better placed to determine that harm: Parliament or the
courts? The majority of the Supreme Court was correct to leave this
24

In R. v. Downey (2002), 208 N.S.R. (2d) 153, [2002] N.S.J. No. 442 (S.C.) and R. v.
Stewart, [1996] O.J. No. 2704 (Prov. Div.), the courts held that such a defence was never
applicable in domestic violence cases; while in R. v. Da Costa, [1991] Y.J. No. 64 (Terr. Ct.)
the trial judge found that a slap in the face was not a trivial assault, but granted the accused
husband a conditional discharge. In R. v. Periovolaris (1998), 41 W.C.B. (2d) 124 (Ont. Prov.
Div.) (pulling necklace off wife’s neck) and R. v. Peniston, [2003] N.S.J. No. 29 (Prov. Ct.)
(pushing wife during argument in public place), acquittals were entered based on the application of the de minimis defence.
25
Such a result would produce the irony that the most vulnerable accused would be the
least able to avoid conviction, since the effects on them of marijuana consumption are not
trivial.

226

Supreme Court Law Review

(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d)

job to Parliament and not use the substantive component of “fundamental justice” to sit as an unelected legislature. Leaving this determination to the Parliamentary process makes sense, if only because it
allows Parliament to respond to arguments about degrees of harm and
about the methods best suited to address them. After all, there are
many advocates for the decriminalization of “hard” drugs as well, on
the ground that they are a health issue rather than a criminal one; the
26
Charter is not the instrument of choice for advancing such claims.
Of course, the adoption of the trivial harm standard is not unproblematic. It seems to suggest that Parliament could criminalize any activity that met the legitimate interest threshold. Since it is almost always
possible to identify some harmful consequence of an activity to the actor
or to others, this gives the criminal law power an almost unlimited
scope. For example, could Parliament criminalize golf because of the
environmental damage required to produce the courses, or the risk to
others from errant flying balls?27 Even if the criminal law power is limited to those subjects that have traditionally been the subject of the
criminal law, combined with the more than trivial harm requirement,
this may not be enough to protect golf from prohibition. After all, the
Criminal Code does impose penalties in the context of a number of
other sports, such as waterskiing at night.28 There appears to be no constitutional impediment to the creation of a criminal offence of “golfing
at night” on the same reasoning. Perhaps these examples suggest that the
correct debate is not one of the relative significance of harm to others,
versus harm to community values, versus harm to self, but rather the
level and certainty of harm of any of these kinds that flows from the
potentially criminal act. Or perhaps we are content to let golfers, water
skiers and consumers of marijuana use the democratic process to resist

26

For a useful discussion of the perceived benefits and probable consequences of legalization or decriminalization of cocaine and heroin, see R.J. MacCoun and P. Reuter, Drug
War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times and Places (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 328-41.
27
After all, the Court has already confirmed in its freedom of association cases that
golf is not a constitutionally protected activity: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 408, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10.
28
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 250(2).
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overcriminalization as they see it, and leave the courts, and section 7 of
the Charter, out of such debates.29

III. SECTION 15 AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE REVIVAL
While the guarantee of equality in section 15(1) of the Charter was
raised in both Malmo-Levine and Canadian Foundation, it was given
serious consideration only in the latter decision. In Malmo-Levine, the
appellant argued that the offence of possession of marijuana for the
purpose of trafficking discriminated on the basis of “substance orientation” or “occupational orientation” as analogous grounds under section
15(1).30 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument that
these were cognizable grounds of discrimination under section 15:
The true focus of s. 15 is to “remedy or prevent discrimination against
groups subject to stereotyping, historical disadvantage and political and
social prejudice in Canadian society”: Swain, supra at p. 992, per Lamer
C.J.; and Rodriguez, supra, at p. 616. To uphold Malmo-Levine’s
argument for recreational choice (or lifestyle protection) on the basis of s.
31
15 of the Charter would simply be to create a parody of a noble purpose.

This conclusion is hardly surprising; the Court has been justifiably
reluctant to recognize new analogous grounds of discrimination solely
on the basis that individuals have been criminally prosecuted on the

29

I have not considered in this article the s. 7 claim advanced in Canadian Foundation,
despite the concern it has caused to others: see Paul Burstein and Roslyn Levine, Q.C. in this
volume. In particular, they are concerned that Canadian Foundation’s argument that s. 43 of
the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter was an attempt to use s. 7 as a “sword” that
would require the government to criminalize certain behaviour that harms others, rather than
as a “shield” to limit the ability of government to create crimes. I do not think that the s. 7
challenge in Canadian Foundation should be viewed in this manner. The Foundation was
challenging something that Parliament had affirmatively done, namely enacting the s. 43
defence. It was not seeking an order that Parliament do anything; it was asking the Court to
strike down an existing section of the Code. I have not dealt with that argument at length
here, since I am of the view that Canadian Foundation is a case about children’s equality
rights, and since in the s. 15(1) context the distinction between positive and negative rights
has been undermined, thankfully, by the decision in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493,
[1998] S.C.J. No. 29.
30
Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. N-1, s. 4(2); repealed and replaced by Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, Schedule II, s. 1.
31
Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 185.
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basis of those characteristics. The mere fact that criminalization is tied
to a particular behaviour or personal characteristic that a group of individuals share — a sexual interest in children or the enjoyment of animal
abuse — does not tell us very much about whether the criminalization is
discriminatory or implicates an equality interest, as socially defined.
In order to sustain his argument, the appellant in this case attempted
to argue that criminalization for “harmless hedonism” demonstrated the
nexus to the discriminatory action on the part of the state. This characterization, of course, brings us right back to the harm principle considered under section 7. For the section 15(1) argument to be a distinct
constitutional claim, the appellant would need to argue that even if it is
not a principle of fundamental justice that there must be a significant
risk of harm to others before an activity can be subject to a penalty of
imprisonment, the use of the criminal law for only some activities that
fail to meet this standard is discriminatory, a point already rejected by
the Court under the “arbitrary or irrational” test. Alternatively, the
claimants might have tried to show some discriminatory pattern in the
enforcement of the law, a point apparently not developed in argument,
notwithstanding disproportionate numbers of young adults prosecuted
under the statute.
An important section 15(1) argument was made in Canadian Foundation, in which the Foundation argued that the reasonable correction
defence in section 43 of the Criminal Code discriminated against children on the basis of their age, by providing accused persons with a defence to the assault of children in some circumstances that would not
apply to assault of an adult victim. The majority of the Court, in reasons
written by McLachlin C.J., found no infringement of section 15(1). The
Court’s rather cursory conclusion on this point is not encouraging for
those who despair at the ongoing inability of the Supreme Court to grasp
the concept of substantive equality.
The ground of discrimination, age, is an enumerated ground, so there
can be no dispute that section 15(1) is engaged. There is also no question
that the Code provision imposes a disadvantage on children not imposed on
adults, namely the disadvantage of being hit or slapped or restrained by a
parent or a teacher in circumstances where that adult is shielded from
criminal prosecution by operation of the defence. The majority rejects the
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assertion that this fact alone is not enough to make the provision discriminatory because it would “ . . . equat[e] equal treatment with identical treat32
ment, a proposition which our jurisprudence has consistently rejected”.
This is quite true as an abstract principle, but it does not automatically explain why facially disadvantageous treatment can be justified in this case.
To answer that question, the Court reformulates the applicable standard for
a section 15(1) violation multiple times, until it eventually produces a test
that allows it to find that there is no age discrimination in the operation of
section 43 of the Code.
The majority begins by invoking the general principles set out in the
Law33 decision, namely “whether a reasonable person possessing the
claimant’s attributes and in the claimant’s circumstances would conclude that the law marginalizes the claimant or treats her as less worthy
on the basis of irrelevant characteristics”.34 However, the majority continues, since this would raise the fiction of the “reasonable, fullyapprised, preschool-aged child”, the correct relevant perspective is that
of the “reasonable person acting on behalf of a child, who seriously
values the child’s views and developmental needs”.35 The majority fails
to notice that this person sounds a lot like the accused, or at least like the
accused as characterized by defence counsel, creating an odd vantage
point from which to judge the interests of victims of what would otherwise be assaults. The majority then proceeds to combine these standards, asking whether “... viewed from the perspective of the reasonable
person identified above, does Parliament’s choice not to criminalize
reasonable use of corrective force against children offend their human
dignity and freedom, by marginalizing them or treating them as less
worthy without regard to their actual circumstances?”36
This assessment, in turn, is to be determined by regard to the four
factors first identified in Law: “(1) pre-existing disadvantage; (2) correspondence between the distinction and the claimant’s characteristics or
circumstances; (3) the existence of ameliorative purposes or effects; and
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Canadian Foundation, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 51.
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12.
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Canadian Foundation, supra, note 32, at para. 53.
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Id.
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Id., at para. 54.
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(4) the nature of the interest affected”.37 The majority finds that the first,
third and fourth of these factors are met: children are members of a
vulnerable group; the defence is not designed to ameliorate the condition of persons belonging to another more disadvantaged group, and the
interest affected — bodily integrity — is profound.
However, the Court finds no discrimination because the second factor, “correspondence with actual circumstances”, shows that the law is
not discriminatory. Chief Justice McLachlin argues that children need
not only protection from physical harm, but also guidance and discipline
from parents and teachers. This, in turn, requires a “stable and secure
family and school setting”. She argues that section 43 accommodates
these needs of children by resorting to the criminal law only when force
is used not as part of a genuine effort at correction and poses no reasonable risk of harm that is more than transitory or trifling. To do otherwise
“risks ruining lives and breaking up families”. This leads her to conclude:
I am satisfied that a reasonable person acting on behalf of a child,
apprised of the harms of criminalization that section 43 avoids, the
presence of other governmental initiatives to reduce the use of corporal
punishment, and the fact that abusive and harmful conduct is still
prohibited by the criminal law, would not conclude that the child’s dignity
has been offended in a manner contemplated by section 15(1). Children
often feel a sense of dispowerment and vulnerability; this reality must be
considered when assessing the impact of section 43 on a child’s sense of
38
dignity.

Without section 43, the majority reasons, parents and teachers
would risk criminal punishment for placing a child in a chair for a fiveminute “time out”.39 The fact that the reasonable person here is supposed
to take into account the “views of the child” seems to have fallen out of
the analysis, except insofar as children are assumed not to want their
families torn apart. Whether children have views on whether being hit
teaches them anything, and if so, what those lessons are, is not considered.

37
38
39

Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 68.
Id., at para. 62.
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The section 15(1) analysis employed by the majority in this case
makes abundantly clear the shortcomings of the Law test for discrimination, as refined and reinterpreted in subsequent cases. The first and most
obvious problem with the Law test is the focus on “dignity” as a proxy
for equality. In Law, the Court found that the purpose of equality rights
was to recognize the fundamental human dignity of each individual, in
the sense of their inherent self-worth. This statement is hard to criticize;
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the assertion
that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.40
But this does not mean that dignity is the same thing as equality. That
the two are distinct concepts is made clear in the constitutions of countries such as Germany and South Africa, which provide specific rights to
dignity quite apart from their constitutional equality rights.41
In particular, the dignity principle should not mean that the claimant
in an equality rights case should have to prove that the discrimination in
question was not only discriminatory but also demeaning to the claimant’s dignity. As applied by the Court, this requirement has the odd
effect of penalizing individuals who are able to maintain their dignity in
the face of oppression. It makes it much more difficult to challenge
differential allocations of benefits, since the government’s inevitably
benign purpose can be pointed to as meaning that there is no assault on
dignity. This tends to ignore the fact that it is both the purpose and the
effect of government action that must be scrutinized when a Charter
claim is made and threatens to return us to an intent-based definition of
discrimination.42 The Court’s reasoning seems to be that since inequality
is a repudiation of essential human dignity, and since discrimination
produces inequality, the way to discover if there has been discrimination
is to look for proof of indignity. Why the Court cannot just consider
discrimination and inequality directly is unclear.
40

G.A. Res. 217A(111) (10 December 1948), art. 1.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, c. 2, s. 10; Basic Law
(23 May 1949) art. 1(1). For a critique of the use of “dignity” in equality rights cases in the
German context, see Susanne Baer, “Pornography and Sexual Harassment in the EU”, in
Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist Challenge, R.A. Elman, ed.
(Berghahn Books: 1996) 56. See also D. Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to
Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001)13 C.J.W.L. 37, at 55-56 (critiquing the dignity test
in Canada with an example from the South African case law).
42
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Meiorin”].
41
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In Canadian Foundation, one might have thought that use of the
dignity analysis would have benefitted the claimants, since being hit or
slapped without the legal recourse available to other human beings is
certainly demeaning. The majority is able to avoid confronting this
problem directly by resorting to the four factors identified in Law. Despite the fact that these factors were never intended to be exhaustive or
rigidly applied, the majority treats them as a four-part test and applies
them mechanically to exclude the claim. In particular, there is little
analysis of the way in which the factors relate to one another. The importance of the interest in physical integrity, the vulnerability of children, and the absence of ameliorative purposes for other disadvantaged
groups are not enough to dislodge the conclusion that there is no discrimination, since the “lack of correspondence” test is not met.
Canadian Foundation shows once again the danger of the “correspondence” factor, which, as Binnie J. notes in his partial dissent,
threatens to reincarnate the discredited “relevance” test from the Miron
v. Trudel trilogy.43 This concern is heightened where, as in this case, the
Court uses the phrases “less worthy on the basis of irrelevant characteristics” and “less worthy without regard to their actual circumstances”
interchangeably.44 Inviting judges to determine whether the legislative
distinction at issue “corresponds” to the claimant’s needs and circumstances allows them to use the same kind of circular reasoning that poisoned section 15(1) analysis under the “relevance” test.45 It invites
judges to speculate on what the claimant’s “circumstances” are, and
then make conclusions as to whether the purpose of the legislative distinction is related to them. The potential for stereotyping that uses the
impact of pre-existing discrimination to justify further related discrimination is clear. Applied mechanically, this factor permits the Court to
ignore the nature of the historic disadvantage and the way in which the
distinction in question might contribute to that disadvantage, which is
the essence of a substantive equality analysis.
43

Canadian Foundation, supra, note 32, at para. 97, citing Gonthier J., dissenting in
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44.
44
Id., at paras. 53 and 54.
45
For criticism of Law, see B. Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000)
11 Const. Forum 65, at 71-73; S. Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social
Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 327-30; for a slightly more optimistic view, see D.
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299.
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Such an analysis, alive to the social and historical context in which
the impugned practice and the ground of discrimination co-exist, would
not end the vulnerability analysis by simply concluding, as the majority
does here, that children are a vulnerable group and that the extent of
their powerlessness is somehow mitigated by the fact that children “often feel a sense of disempowerment and vulnerability” at the hands of
adults. On a substantive equality analysis, the fact that the vulnerability
is chronic should heighten, rather than diminish, the scrutiny that is
brought to bear on the legislative distinction, given that so many laws
affect children in a differential and disempowering fashion. More importantly, a substantive equality analysis should consider the historic
vulnerability of children in the context of the practice at issue, namely
the use of force against them by parents and teachers. On this point,
there is ample evidence that children have been and continue to be the
recipients of widespread physical and sexual violence at the hands of
those persons who are entrusted with their care, and that this violence is
age-based as a social practice. In 1998, there were an estimated 61,000
substantiated reports of child maltreatment (physical, sexual and emotional) investigated by police and children’s aid societies in Canada.
Sixty-nine per cent of substantiated cases of physical abuse of children,
or about 9,700 cases, involved inappropriate punishment, that is abuse
administered under the guise of “correction”. Another 5,300 cases involved suspected physical abuse in the guise of punishment.46
It might also have been useful to consider the history in this country
of physical abuse by teachers in residential schools, directed disproportionately at First Nations and disabled children, and whether giving
teachers some licence to use physical correction contributed to that
abuse or the difficulty of exposing it. It is this context which explains
why any lack of convincing proof that the use of mild force is harmful is
not especially relevant to a discrimination analysis. The point is that
there is ample proof that parents and teachers meting out discipline are
often unable or unwilling to limit themselves to mild force.

46

Health Canada, Child Maltreatment Section. The Canadian Incidence Study of Reported Child Abuse and Neglect, 2001, available online at <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/pphbdgspsp>; N. Trocme, J. Durrant, R. Ensom, and I. Marwah, “Physical Abuse of Children in
the Context of Punishment”, Centre of Excellence for Child Welfare fact sheet #8E, 2004,
available online at <http://www.cecw-cepb.ca>.
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Another part of the social context unmentioned by the Court is that
there is another age-based group whose members are subject to violence
at the hands of their family members and caregivers, namely the elderly,
and that this group is not excluded from the protection of the criminal
offence of assault on the basis that it risks breaking up their families to
include them.47
“Age-based” in this context does not refer to the formal distinction
that children are younger than adults. It is not the youth of children per
se that is the source of their social inequality. Children are not a historically disadvantaged group because they are young. This reasoning has
led courts to conclude that some kinds of disadvantageous treatment of
children or young people are not discriminatory because they will not be
young forever.48 But the permanence of the ground is not crucial to the
experience of discrimination, except perhaps to its severity. After all,
pregnancy is also a temporary condition, but pregnancy discrimination
is still recognized as sex discrimination. Societal discrimination against
children is a product of the state-sanctioned exploitation by adults of the
inherent power imbalance between adults and children. That exploitation includes, for example, the practices identified in the international
conventions designed to safeguard children’s rights, such as physical
and sexual violence, child labour and lack of access to education, child
marriage and other practices that stunt the ability of children to realize
their full potential to exercise fully the rights and privileges of adulthood.49
Regardless of the legal regime in place for responding to the violence against them, children are not able to prevent or defend against
this violence because of their size, intellectual development and dependence on adults. This is the (in)capacity that is “relevant” to the section
15(1) analysis. The question, then, should be whether section 43 of the

47

L. McDonald and A. Collins, Abuse and Neglect of Older Adults: A Discussion Paper (Health Canada, Family Violence Prevention Unit, 2000), at 13-15. The authors note that
while telephone surveys of older adults living at home indicate rates of physical and verbal
abuse of 2-7 per cent, these numbers are probably low because of reluctance to disclose and
the omission of cognitively impaired older adults from such surveys.
48
See, e.g., the comments of McLachlin C.J. for the majority in Gosselin v. Quebec
(Attorney-General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at 468, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85.
49
See, e.g., the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (20 November
1999).
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Criminal Code, in its purpose or effect, augments that vulnerability and
that history of violence. If this question is answered in the affirmative,
then absent some overriding ameliorative purpose for another disadvantaged group, the provision is discriminatory and violates section 15(1).
Questions of justification (the purported need for some discipline that
takes a physical form, the preference of Parliament to use education
rather than criminalization to reduce the use of physical discipline)
should be left for the section 1 analysis.
In answering the question whether section 43 augments the existing
vulnerability of children to parental and institutional violence, it is first
necessary to confront an important problem of Charter analysis relating
to the use that can be made of the existing decisions interpreting and
applying section 43 of the Criminal Code. These decisions are, on the
whole, remarkable for the frequency with which they interpret section
43 to permit parents and teachers to use a considerable degree of force
against a wide age range of children, encompassing weapons, bruising,
blows to the head, kicking, and physical restraint.50 One approach to this
body of precedent, favoured by the majority, is to use the existing cases
interpreting and applying section 43 of the Criminal Code as merely a
context for reinterpreting the provision to minimize the potential for
violence against children in the future. In this way the Supreme Court
creates a clean slate for the provision’s application, and concludes that
under its new interpretation, the defence will not contribute to discrimination against children. The second approach, adopted by Deschamps J.
in her dissent, is to use those cases as proof that section 43, as applied,
does augment that disadvantage.
The relevance of “past practice” in the application of a challenged
provision is accepted in other Charter contexts, such as in freedom of
expression challenges under section 2(b).51 Yet the degree to which this
past practice can be obliterated through reinterpretation of the provision

50

A summary of these cases is found in the dissenting reasons of Arbour J., dissenting,
at paras. 153-70.
51
For example in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, the Court considered the past practice of Canada
Customs in determining whether the claimant’s rights had been violated and whether Customs could be expected to avoid such violations in the future.
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is a matter of continuing debate.52 In this case, it would seem logical to
follow the approach of Arbour J. in her dissent on the section 7 claim,
and to use the judicial history as evidence of how the provision is likely
to be applied, given that the decisions turn on what is “reasonable
force”, rather than on any clear split on a question of statutory interpretation. As Arbour J. points out, the majority’s approach confirms the
extremely narrow ambit of the vagueness doctrine under section 7, since
past practice, however compelling, is always insufficient to prove that
the provision is not capable of clear judicial interpretation. Moreover, if
lower courts continue to be unable to apply the provision consistently
after the Supreme Court decision, it will be almost impossible to renew
the vagueness challenge since the Court has declared the provision to be
not vague. In any event, whatever the case may be under the section 7
vagueness doctrine, section 15(1) is clearly context-based. The way in
which the defence has been applied, and the kind of abuse that has been
considered “reasonable force”, are highly relevant considerations in
deciding whether the operation of the defence violates children’s equality rights.
Justice Binnie, dissenting in part, recognizes the shortcomings of the
majority’s section 15(1) analysis, and finds that the section is violated.
As noted above, he criticizes the majority for its reliance on the “correspondence” factor as a litmus test for discrimination. Unfortunately, he
imports the same kind of reasoning into the section 1 analysis, which
leads him to uphold section 43 as it applies to parents for much the same
reasons as the majority relies on in its section 15(1) analysis. In particular, he agrees that the “values of privacy in family life” justify the availability of the section 43 defence to parents as a reasonable limit on
children’s equality rights. In so doing, he fails to consider whether the
deficits of the “correspondence” test are really eradicated simply by
moving them to section 1. In particular, the balancing of means and ends
contemplated by section 1 is not the same as correspondence between
the needs of the claimant (the child) and the legislative measures at
issue.
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R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15 is another decision in which
the Supreme Court chose to treat prior inconsistent lower court decisions as evidence of the
need for clear directions from the Court rather than evidence that the law was unconstitutional.
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The reliance of both the majority and Binnie J. on the “privacy of
the family” as a justification for upholding the “reasonable correction”
defence is acutely disappointing in an equality rights challenge focused
on acts of physical violence. Surely this “interest” has now been thoroughly discredited, especially in the context of family violence. Feminist scholars have successfully shifted public opinion away from the
myth that battering and rape of women by their boyfriends and husbands
are “private” matters.53 Merely because an assault takes place in the
bedrooms, or for that matter the playrooms, of the nation, does not mean
that the state has no business intervening in it; most abuse of women
and children takes place in the home. The home is a very dangerous
place for many women and children and it is perverse to suggest that
children benefit from respect for the privacy of family life when that
“private life” includes violence against them.
Section 43 of the Criminal Code undeniably “withholds from children protection of their physical integrity in circumstances where the
amount of force used would be criminal if used against an adult”.54 If the
concern is that we cannot rely on police and prosecutorial discretion to
prevent prosecution for a “pat on the bum”, we need to consider why we
are prepared to criminalize such assaults when they occur against adults
and rely on that same discretion to screen out such trivial touchings.
Children are hardly more likely than adults to phone the police in order
to resolve minor disputes. There is little question, of course, that the
principle of absolute physical autonomy that is applied to adults is not
and cannot be applied to pre-adolescent children, if only for reasons of
their safety. But the provision covers correction, not protection. One
wonders what degree of associated force is permissible to enforce the
Chief Justice’s example of the “five-minute time out”. In R. v. Murphy,
it involved the use of electrical tape to restrain a three-year old child to a
chair, during which time he urinated on himself.55 In 1996, this conduct
53

F. Olsen was one of the first feminist legal scholars to offer a detailed critique of the
public/private distinction: “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform” (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497; “Unraveling Compromise” (1989) 103 Harv. L. Rev.
105. See also, C.A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989), at 187-94, C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987), at 99-101.
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was found to be within the section 43 defence by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.
Another way of looking at this question is to consider whether children have anything in common with the groups of people previously
excluded from the full protection of criminal assault provisions through
the operation of other categorical defences. These groups would include
wives, employees and apprentices, and passengers on ships.56 There may
be something to be learned from the decision to abolish rules sheltering
husbands and employers from prosecution for assaults of individuals
under their control. These repeals reflected an evolving societal recognition that persons in positions of power should be monitored in the exercise of that power, rather than given free rein to exercise violent
“ownership” over individuals who are financially or emotionally dependent on them. This reasoning of course, applies quite directly to the
situation of parents or teachers and the children over whom they exercise power and control.
Justice Deschamps does find a violation of section 15(1) that is not
saved by section 1. Significantly, she applies the three-step analysis set
out in Law and based on the seminal decision in Andrews v. Law Society
of British Columbia:
First, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or
(b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position
within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics? If so, there is differential treatment for the purpose of
section 15(1). Second, was the claimant subject to differential treatment
on the basis of one or more of the enumerated and analogous grounds?
And third, does the differential treatment discriminate in a substantive
sense, bringing into play the purpose of section 15(1) of the Charter in
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In Lord Leigh’s Case (1677), 3 Keb. 433 (H.L.) the House of Lord’s stated that while
husbands could not beat their wives, they were entitled to use force for “admonition”. By
1891, the principle was referred to as “quaint and absurd”: R. V. Jackson, [1891] 60 L.J.R.
346 (Q.B.). The right of masters to discipline apprentices was deleted from s. 43 in the 1955
amendments. The right of a captain to discipline a passenger was repealed in 2001: S.C. 2001,
c. 26, s. 294.
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On this analysis, the question is whether the differential treatment
discriminates against children in a substantive sense. Justice Deschamps
correctly notes that the four Law factors relevant to this analysis are not
exhaustive or automatically applicable. While she also uses “impairment
of dignity” as a proxy for substantive inequality, she correctly focuses
on the effect of the differential treatment of children by Parliament
rather than whether corporal punishment is itself always demeaning or
never carried out for a proper purpose. Unfortunately, she also goes
through a rote application of the four factors, but does come to a different conclusion on the “correspondence” factor, based on her view that:
There is a general consensus among experts that the only benefit of mild
to moderate uses of force, such as spanking, is short-term compliance.
Anything more serious is not conducive to furthering the education of
children, but also potentially harmful to their development and health. …
It cannot seriously be argued that children need corporal punishment to
grow and learn. Indeed, their capacities and circumstances would
58
generally point in the opposite direction...

Because section 43 had not been applied in such a restrictive fashion, and could not be so restricted without re-writing the statute in complete opposition to its terms, she found that section 15(1) was violated.
Justice Deschamps’ reliance on the lack of benefit arising from most
corporal punishment echoes her fact-driven conclusions in MalmoLevine that consumption of marijuana is a largely harmless activity.
While this approach makes some sense when she is applying a “harm
principle” under section 7 to marijuana possession, it is more dangerous
in the section 15(1) context. The Court should leave the balancing of the
harms and benefits of corporal punishment to section 1, and focus on the
effect of the defence on children in the context of their social experience
of violence at the hands of parents and teachers. None of the members
of the Court undertaking a section 15(1) analysis in this case considered
the physical punishment of children as a social practice in the context of
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the relatively recent recognition of child abuse by parents as a serious
and neglected problem.
The practical danger of the majority’s decision is that parents and
teachers will simply consider the decision an endorsement of their
power to “spank” children, and fail to understand the Court’s attempt to
reinterpret the provision restrictively. One is left to hope that lower
courts considering the defence in future will truly limit its application to
those uses of force that “restrain, control or express some symbolic
disapproval”.59
Since the decision in Canadian Foundation, there appears to be only
one unreported case that considers section 43 of the Code, and its inattention to the Supreme Court’s restrictions on the defence is hardly
encouraging. In R. v. P. (D.),60 the accused kicked his 14 year-old
daughter, bruising her leg. The kick was administered because she refused to get into his car and return home. In convicting the accused of
assault, the trial judge referred to the decision in Canadian Foundation
as upholding the constitutionality of section 43, but did not make reference to any of the interpretive guidance provided by the Court. Most
notably, the trial judge did not refer to the majority’s statement that
force used against children over 12 years of age is per se unreasonable.
Instead, he relies on prior lower court authority and finds the force unreasonable because it was not escalating force.61

IV. CONCLUSION
The majority decisions in Malmo-Levine and Canadian Foundation
are, at their core, contradictory. The Court is prepared in Malmo-Levine
to permit Parliament to criminalize any conduct that poses a risk of
harm that is more than trivial. This rightfully leaves complex debates
about risks and benefits of marijuana consumption to the democratic
process. The Court is not prepared in Canadian Foundation to limit the
ability of Parliament to shield individuals from criminal liability for
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causing harm to children, on the ground that the section can be restrictively interpreted to apply to only “trivial” punishments. Yet if the
Court’s reasoning in Malmo-Levine is applied in this context, trivial
assaults would automatically be excluded from the offence of assault by
the operation of section 7 of the Charter anyway.
To date, section 43 of the Criminal Code has been a de maximis
defence that should have been found to violate section 15(1) of the
62
Charter. Striking down the defence would have ended the demonstrated practice of using section 43 to shield abusive parents from
conviction rather than shielding their children from violence.

62

This article does not consider in any depth the s. 1 argument that would flow from
such a finding, since even if the government could articulate a pressing and substantial
objective where touchings are minor or required for the safety of the child, s. 43 as currently
drafted is not rationally connected to those objectives and does not minimally impair children’s equality rights.

